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Abstract
Theoretical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols commonly rely on the use of qubits (quantum
bits). In reality, however, due to practical limitations, the legitimate users are forced to employ a larger
quantum (Hilbert) space, say a quhexit (quantum six-dimensional) space, or even a much larger quantum
Hilbert space. Various specific attacks exploit of these limitations. Although security can still be proved
in some very special cases, a general framework that considers such realistic QKD protocols, as well as
attacks on such protocols, is still missing.
We describe a general method of attacking realistic QKD protocols, which we call the ‘quantum-
space attack’. The description is based on assessing the enlarged quantum space actually used by a
protocol, the ‘quantum space of the protocol’. We demonstrate these new methods by classifying various
(known) recent attacks against several QKD schemes, and by analyzing a novel attack on interferometry-
based QKD.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography has brought us new ways of exchanging a secret key between two users (known
as Alice and Bob). The security of such Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) methods is based on a very
basic rule of nature and quantum mechanics—the “no-cloning” principle. The first QKD protocol was
suggested in a seminal paper by Bennett and Brassard [5] in 1984, and is now known as BB84. During
recent years many security analyses were published [46, 35, 6, 42, 7, 22] which proved the information-
theoretical security of the BB84 scheme against the most general attack by an unlimited adversary (known
as Eve), who has full control over the quantum channel1. Those security proofs are limited as they always
consider a theoretical QKD that uses perfect qubits. Although these security proofs do take errors into
account, and the protocols use error correction and privacy amplification (to compensate for these errors and
for reducing any partial knowledge that Eve might have), in general, they avoid security issues that arise
from the implementation of qubits in the real world.
A pivotal paper by Brassard, Lu¨tkenhaus, Mor, and Sanders [12, 13] presented the “Photon Number
Splitting (PNS) attack” and exposed a security flaw in experimental and practical QKD: One must take into
account the fact that Alice does not generate perfect qubits (2 basis-states of a single photon), but, instead,
generates states that reside in an enlarged Hilbert space (we call it “quantum space” here), of six dimensions.
The reason for that discrepancy in the size of the used quantum space is that each electromagnetic pulse that
Alice generates contains (in addition to the two dimensions spanned by the single-photon states) also a
1All QKD protocols assume that Alice and Bob also use an insecure, yet unjammable, classical channel.
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vacuum state and three 2-photon states, and these are extremely useful to the eavesdropper. That paper
proved that, in contrast to what was assumed in previous papers, Eve can make use of the enlarged space,
and get a lot of information on the secret key, sometimes even full information, without inducing any noise.
Many attacks on the practical protocols then followed (e.g., [25, 26, 24, 36, 34, 21]), based on extensions of
the quantum spaces, exploring various additional security flaws; other papers [25, 40, 45] suggested possible
ways to overcome such attacks. On the one hand, several security proofs, considering specific imperfections,
were given for the BB84 protocol [24, 27]. Yet on the other hand, it is generally impossible now to prove
the security of a practical protocol, since a general framework that considers such realistic QKD protocols,
and the possible attacks on such protocols, is still missing.
We show that the PNS attack, and actually all attacks directed at the channel, are various special cases
of a general attack that we define here, the Quantum-Space Attack (QSA). The QSA generalizes existing
attacks and also offers novel attacks. The QSA is based on the fact that the “qubits” manipulated in the
QKD protocol actually reside in a larger Hilbert space, and this enlarged space can be assessed. Although
this enlarged space is not fully accessible to the legitimate users, they can still analyze it, and learn what
a fully powerful eavesdropper can do. We believe that this assessment of the enlarged “quantum space
of the protocol” is a vital step on the way to proving or disproving the unconditional security of practical
QKD schemes. We focus on schemes in which the quantum communication is uni-directional, namely, from
Alice’s laboratory (lab) to Bob’s lab. We consider an adversary that can attack all the quantum states that
come out of Alice’s lab, and all the quantum states that go into Bob’s lab.
The paper is organized as follows: Definitions of the quantum spaces involved in the realization of
a protocol, and of the “quantum space of the protocol”, are presented and discussed in Section 2. The
“quantum-space attack” is defined and discussed in Section 3. Using the general framework when the
information carriers are photons is discussed in Section 4. Next, in Section 5 we show that the best known
attacks on practical QKD are special cases of the QSA. Section 6 demonstrates and analyzes a novel QSA
on an interferometric implementation of the BB84 and the six-state QKD protocols. Last, we discuss a few
subtleties and open problems for future research in Section 7.
We would like to emphasize that our (crypt)analysis presents the difficulty of proving unconditional
security for practical QKD setups, yet also provides an important (probably even vital) step in that direction.
2 The Quantum Space of the Protocol
The Quantum Space Attack (QSA) is the most general attack on the quantum channel that connects Alice
to Bob. It can be applied to any realistic QKD protocol, yet here we focus on uni-directional schemes and
on implementations of the BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol. We need to have a proper model of
the protocol in order to understand the Hilbert space that an unlimited Eve can attack. This space has never
been analyzed before except for specific cases. Our main finding is a proper description of this space, which
allows, for the first time, defining the most general eavesdropping attack on the channel. We start with a
model of a practical “qubit”, continue with understanding the spaces used by Alice and Bob, and end by
defining the relevant space, the Quantum Space of the Protocol (QSoP), used by Eve to attack the protocol.
The attacks on the QSoP are what we call Quantum-Space Attacks.
2.1 Alice’s realistic space
In most QKD protocols, Alice sends Bob qubits, namely, states of 2 dimensional quantum spaces (H2).
A realistic view should take into account any deviation from theory, caused by Alice’s equipment. For
example, Alice might encode the qubit via a polarized photon: |0z〉 via a photon polarized horizontally, and
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|1z〉 polarized vertically. This can be written using Fock notation2 as |nh, nv〉F where nh (nv) represents the
number of horizontal (vertical) photons; then |0z〉 ≡ |1, 0〉F and |1z〉 ≡ |0, 1〉F. When Alice’s photon is lost
within her equipment (or during the transmission), Bob gets the state |0, 0〉F, so that Alice’s realistic space
becomes H3. Alice might send multiple photons and then HA is of higher dimension, see Section 4.2.
Definition 1. Alice’s realistic space, HA, is the minimal space containing the actual quantum states sent
by Alice to Bob during the QKD protocol.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice sends qubits in two3 fixed conjugate bases. Theoretically, Alice randomly
chooses a basis and a bit value and sends the chosen bit encoded in the appropriate chosen basis as a state in
H2 (e.g. |0z〉,|1z〉, |0x〉 = (|0z〉+ |1z〉) /
√
2, and |1x〉 = (|0z〉 − |1z〉) /
√
2). To a better approximation, the
states sent by Alice are four different states |ψi〉A (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in her realistic space HA, spanned by these
four states. This space HA is of dimension |HA|, commonly between 2 and 4, depending on the specific
implementation. As practical instruments often diverse from theory, Alice might send quite different states.
As an extreme example, see the tagging attack (Section 5.2), which is based on the fact that Alice’s space
could contain more than just these four theoretical states, so that |HA| > 4 is possible.
2.2 Extension of Alice’s space
Bob commonly receives one of several possible states |ψi〉A sent by Alice, and measures it. The most general
measurement Bob can perform is to add an ancilla, perform a unitary transformation on the joint system,
perform a complete measurement, and potentially “forget”4 some of the outcomes5. However, once Alice’s
space is larger than H2, the extra dimensions provided by Alice could be used by Bob for his measurement,
instead of adding an ancilla. Interestingly, by his measurement Bob might be extending the space vulnerable
to Eve’s attack well beyond HA. This is possible since in many cases the realistic space, HA, is embedded
inside a larger space M .
Definition 2. The space M is the space in which HA is embedded, HA ⊆ M . The space M is the actual
space available for Alice and an Eavesdropper.
Due to the presence of an eavesdropper, Bob’s choice whether to add an ancilla or to use the extended
spaceM is vital for security analysis. In the first case the ancilla is added by Bob, inside his lab, while in the
second it is controlled by Alice, transferred through the quantum channel and exposed to Eve’s deeds. Eve
might attack the extended space M , and thus have a different effect on Bob, considering his measurement
method.
For example, suppose Alice sends two non-orthogonal states of a qubit, θ0 =
(
cos θ
sin θ
)
and θ1 =
(
cos θ
− sin θ
)
,
with a fixed and known angle 0 ≥ θ ≥ 45◦. Bob would like to distinguish between them, while allowing
inconclusive results sometimes, but no errors [38]. Bob can add the ancilla |0〉Anc ≡
(
1
0
)
Anc
and perform
the following transformation U :
|0〉Anc ⊗
(
cos θ
± sin θ
)
=

cos θ
± sin θ
0
0
 U−→

sin θ
± sin θ√
cos 2θ
0

=
√
2 sin θ|0〉Anc ⊗
(
1/
√
2
±1/√2
)
+
√
cos 2θ|1〉Anc ⊗
(
1
0
)
(1)
2States written using the Fock notation |·〉F are called Fock states, see Section 4.
3The six-state scheme uses the three conjugate bases of the qubit space; namely, also |0y〉 = (|0z〉+ i|1z〉) /
√
2, etc.
4By the term “forget” we mean that Bob’s detection is unable to distinguish between several measured states.
5This entire process can be described in a compact way by using a POVM [39].
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where |1〉Anc ≡
(
0
1
)
Anc
. This operation leads to a conclusive result with probability 2 sin2 θ (when the
measured ancilla is |0〉Anc), and inconclusive result otherwise. It is simple to see that the same measurement
can be done, without the use of an ancilla, if the states θ0 and θ1 are embedded at Alice’s lab in a larger
space M , e.g. M = H3, using Bob’s transformation cos θ± sin θ
0
 U−→
 sin θ± sin θ√
cos 2θ
 . (2)
In the general case, the space M might be very large, even infinite. Bob might use only parts of it, for his
measurements.
A complication in performing security analysis is due to Bob’s option to both use an ancilla and extend
the space used by Alice. Our analysis in the following sections starts with the space extension only (Sections
2.3–2.4), and later on deals with the general case (Sections 2.5–2.6).
2.3 Bob’s space, without an ancilla
Let us formulate the spaces involved in the protocol, as described above. Assume Alice uses the space
HA according to Definition 1, which is embedded in a (potentially larger) space M . Ideally, in the BB84
protocol, Bob would like to measure just the states in HA, but in practice he usually can not do so. Each
one of Alice’s states |ψi〉A is transformed by Bob’s equipment into some pure6 state |ψi〉M ∈M . The space
which is spanned by those states contains all the information about Alice’s states {|ψi〉A}.
More important, Bob might be measuring un-needed subspaces of M which Alice’s states do not span.
For instance, examine the case where Bob uses detectors to measure the Fock states |1, 0〉F and |0, 1〉F. Bob is
usually able to distinguish a loss (the state |0, 0〉F) or an error (e.g. |1, 1〉F, one horizontal photon and one ver-
tical photon), from the two desired states, but he cannot distinguish between other states containing multiple
photons. This means that Bob measures a much larger subspace of the entire spaceM , but (inevitably) inter-
prets outcomes outsideHA as legitimate states; e.g. the states |2, 0〉F, |3, 0〉F, etc. are (mistakenly) interpreted
as |1, 0〉F. See further discussion in Section 4.3.
We denote Bob’s setup (beam splitters, phase shifters, etc.) by the unitary operation UB , followed by
a measurement; all these operations are operating on the space M (or parts of it). Bob might have several
different setups (e.g. a different setup for the z-basis and for the x-basis). Let U be the set of unitary
transformations in all Bob’s setups.
Definition 3. [This definition is Temporary.] Given a specific setup-transformation Uj ∈ U, letHBj ⊆M
be the subsystem actually measured by Bob, having K basis states {|φk〉Bj}k=0...K−1. The set of Bob’s
Measured Spaces is the set {HBj}j=0...J−1 of J = |U| spaces.
We have already seen that Bob might be measuring un-needed dimensions. On the other hand he might
not measure certain subspaces of M , even when Alice’s state might reach there. In either case, the deviation
is commonly due to limitations of Bob’s equipment.
2.4 The quantum space of the protocol, without an ancilla
The “quantum space of the protocol” (QSoP) is in fact Alice’s extended space, taking into consideration
its extensions due to Bob’s measurements. The security analysis of a protocol depends on the space HB
−1
defined below.
6The case in which Bob transposes the state into a mixed state is a special case of the analysis done in Section 2.5. For the
notion of mixed states or quantum mixture see [37, 39].
4
Definition 4. [This definition is Temporary.] The reversed space HB−1 is the Hilbert space spanned by
the states U−1j (|φk〉Bj ), for each possible setup Uj ∈ U, and for each basis state |φk〉Bj of the appropriate
HBj ⊆M .
The Space HB
−1
usually resides in a larger space than HA. For instance, using photons, the ideal space
HA consists of two modes with 2 basis states, see Section 4. Now HB
−1
could have an infinite space in
each mode, but also could have more modes.
In order to derive the quantum space of the protocol we need to define the way Alice’s space is extended
according to HB
−1
, for this simple case where Bob does not add an ancilla. In this case, the space HB
−1
simply extends Alice’s space to yield the QSoP via HP = HA +HB
−1
. Formally speaking
Definition 5. [This definition is Temporary.] The Quantum Space of the Protocol, HP , is the space
spanned by the basis states of the space HA and the basis states of the space HB
−1
.
If Alice’s realistic space is fully measured by Bob’s detection process, then HA is a subspace of HB
−1
,
hence HP = HB
−1
.
2.5 Bob’s space (general case)
In the general case, one must consider Bob’s option to add an ancilla during his measurement process. This
addition causes a considerable difficulty in analyzing a protocol, however it is often an inherent part of the
protocol, and can not be avoided. We denote the added ancilla as the state |0〉B′ that resides in the space
HB
′
.
Definition 6. M ′ is the space that includes the physical space used by Alice as defined in Definition 2, in
addition to Bob’s ancilla, M ′ = M ⊗HB′ .
Bob measures a subspace of the space M ′, so the (permanent) definitions of his measured spaces HBj
and the reversed space HB
−1
should be modified accordingly.
Definition 7. Given a specific setup-transformation Uj ∈ U let HBj ⊆ M ′ be the subsystem actually
measured by Bob, having K basis states {|φk〉Bj}k=0...K−1. The set of Bob’s Measured Spaces, is the set
{HBj}j=0...J−1 of J = |U| spaces.
2.6 The quantum space of the protocol (general case)
The quantum space of the protocol is still Alice’s extended space, while considering its extensions due to
Bob’s measurements. Yet, the added ancilla makes things much more complex. The security analysis of
a protocol depends now not on the space HB
−1
defined below, but on a (potentially much larger) space
obtained from it by tracing-out Bob’s ancilla. As before, we first define the reversed space.
Definition 8. The reversed space HB−1 is the Hilbert space spanned by the states U−1j (|φk〉Bj ), for each
possible setup Uj ∈ U, and for each basis state |φk〉Bj of the appropriate HBj ⊆M ′.
Once a basis state of one of Bob’s measured spaces |φk〉Bj is reversed by U−1j we result with a state
that might, partially, reside in Bob’s ancillary space HB
′
. Since Eve has no access to this space7 it must be
traced-out (separated out), for deriving the QSoP. Let us redefine the QSoP given the addition of the ancilla:
7Giving this space to Eve (for getting an upper bound on her information), might be easier to analyze, but is usually not possible
since it would give her too much power, making the protocol insecure.
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Definition 9. The Quantum Space of the Protocol, HP , is the space spanned by (a) the basis states of the
space HA; and (b) the states TrBob[U−1j (|φk〉Bj )], (namely, after tracing out Bob), for each possible setup
Uj ∈ U, and for each basis state |φk〉Bj of the appropriate space HBj .
Whenever UB entangles Bob’s ancilla with the system sent from Alice, tracing out Bob’s ancilla after
performing U−1B might cause an increase of the QSoP to the dimension of Bob’s ancillary space. For in-
stance, assume Alice’s state is embedded in an n-qubit space to which Bob adds an ancilla of n-qubits and
performs a unitary transformation U , such that for one state measured by Bob, |Ψ〉B U
−1−→ 1
2n/2
∑2n−1
k=0 |k〉P |k〉B′ .
Tracing out Bob from this state yields the maximally mixed state ρP = 12n
∑2n−1
k=0 |k〉〈k|, so that in this ex-
ample the whole n-qubits space is spanned.
3 The Quantum Space Attack
3.1 Eavesdropping on qubits
When Alice and Bob use qubits, in theoretical QKD, Eve can attack the protocol in many ways. In her
simplest attack, the so-called “measure-resend attack”, Eve performs any measurement (of her choice) on
the qubit, and accordingly decides what to send to Bob.
A generalization of that attack is the “translucent attack”, in which Eve attaches an ancilla, in an initial
state |0〉E (and in any dimension she likes), and entangles the ancilla and Alice’s qubit, using |0〉E |i〉A →∑1
j=0 |Eij〉E |j〉A where |i〉A is a basis for Alice’s qubit, and Eve’s states after the unitary transformation are
|Eij〉E . Using this transformation one can define the most general “individual-particle attack” [19, 20], and
also the most general “collective attack” [9, 8]. In the individual-particle attack Eve delays the measurement
of her ancilla till after learning anything she can about the qubit (e.g., its basis), while in the collective attack
Eve delays her measurements further till she learns anything she can about all the qubits (e.g., how the final
key is generated from the obtained string of shared bits), so she attacks directly the final key.
The most general attack that Eve could perform on the channel is to attack all those qubits transmitted
from Alice to Bob, using one large ancilla. This is the “joint attack”. Security, in case Eve tries to learn a
maximal information on the final key, was proven in [46, 35, 6, 42, 7] via various methods. The attack’s
unitary transformation is written as before, but with i a binary string of n bits, and so is j, |0〉E |i〉A →∑2n−1
j=0 |Eij〉E |j〉.
3.2 Eavesdropping on the quantum space of the protocol
By replacing the qubit space H2 by Alice’s realistic “qubit” in the space HA, and by defining Eve’s attack
on the entire space of the protocol HP , we can generalize each of the known attacks on theoretical QKD
to a “quantum space attack” (QSA). We can easily define now Eve’s most general individual-transmission
QSA on a realistic “qubit”, which generalizes the individual-particle attack earlier described. Eve prepares
an ancilla in a state |0〉E , and attaches it to Alice’s state, but actually her ancilla is now attached to the entire
QSoP. Eve performs a unitary transformation UE on the joint state. If Eve’s attack is only on HA, we write
the resulting transformation on any basis state of HA, |i〉A, as |0〉E |i〉A →
∑
j |Eij〉E |j〉A, where the sum
is over the dimension of HA. The Photon-Number-Splitting attack (see Section 5.1) is an example for such
an attack. The most general individual-transmission QSA is based on a translucent QSA on the QSoP,
|0〉E |i〉P →
∑
j
|Eij〉E |j〉P , (3)
where the sum is over the dimension of HP . The subsystem in HP is then sent to Bob while the rest (the
subsystem HE) is kept by Eve. We write the transformation on any basis state of HP , |i〉P , but note that
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it is sufficient to define the transformation on the different states in HA, namely for all states of the form
|i〉A, since other states of the QSoP are never sent by Alice (any other additional subsystem of the QSoP is
necessarily at a known state when it enters Eve’s transformation).
Attacks that are more general than the individual transmission QSA, the collective QSA and the joint
QSA, can now be defined accordingly. In the most general collective QSA, Eve performs the above translu-
cent QSA on many (say, n) realistic “qubits” (potentially a different attack on each one, if she likes), waits
till she gets all data regarding the generation of the final key, and she then measures all the ancillas together,
to obtain the optimal information on the final key or the final secret. The most general attack that Eve could
perform on the channel is to attack all those realistic “qubits” transmitted from Alice to Bob, using one large
ancilla. This is the “joint QSA”. The attack’s unitary transformation is written as before, but with i a string
of n digits rather than a single digit (digits of the relevant dimension of HP ), and so is j,
|0〉E |i〉P⊗n →
|HP |n−1∑
j=0
|Eij〉E |j〉P⊗n . (4)
Eve measures the ancilla, after learning all classical information, to obtain the optimal information on the
final key or the final secret. As before, it is sufficient to define the transformation on the different input states
from (HA)⊗n.
We would like to emphasize several issues: 1.– When analyzing specific attacks, or when trying to obtain
a limited security result, it is always legitimate to restrict the analysis to the relevant (smaller) subspace of
the QSoP, for simplicity, e.g., to HA, or to HB
−1
, etc. 2.– Any bi-directional protocol will have a much
more complicated QSoP, thus it might be extremely difficult to analyze any type of QSA (even the simplest
ones) on such protocols. This remark is especially important since bi-directional protocols play a very
important role in QKD, since they appear in many interesting protocols such as the plug-and-play [33],
the ping-pong [10], and the classical Bob [11] protocols. Specifically they provided (via the plug-and-
play) the only commerical QKD so far [48, 49]. 3.– It is well known that the collective or joint attack is
only finished after Eve gets all quantum and classical information, since she delays her measurements till
then [9, 8, 6, 35, 7]; if she expects more information, she better wait and attack the final secret rather than
the final key; it is important to notice that if the key will be used to encode quantum information (say, qubits)
then the quantum-space of the protocol will require a modification, potentially a major one; It is interesting
to study if this new notion of QSoP has an influence on analysis of such usage of the key as done (for the
ideal qubits) in [4].
4 Photonic Quantum Space Attacks
4.1 Photons as quantum-information carriers
Since most of the practical QKD experiments and products are done using photons, in this section we
demonstrate our QSoP and QSA definitions and methods via photons. Our analysis uses the Fock-Space8
notations for describing photonic quantum spaces. For clarity, states written using the Fock notation are
denoted with the superscript ‘F’, e.g. |0〉F, |3〉F, and |0, 3, 1〉F.
A photon can not be treated as a quantum system in a straightforward way. For instance, unlike dust
particles or grains of sand, photons are indistinguishable particles, meaning that when a couple of photons
are interacting, one cannot define the evolution of the specific particle, but rather describe the whole system.
Let us examine a cavity, for instance. It can contain photons of specific wavelengthes (λ1, λ2, etc.) and
the energy of a photon of wavelength λ is directly proportional to 1/λ. While one cannot distinguish between
8A description of the Fock space and Fock notations can be found in various quantum optic books, e.g. [41].
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photons of the same wavelength, one can distinguish between photons of different wavelengths. Therefore,
it is convenient to define distinguishable “photonic modes”, such that each wavelength corresponds to a
specific mode (so a mode inside a cavity can be denoted by its wavelength), and then count the number of
photons in each mode. If a single photon in a specific mode carries some unit of energy, then n such photons
of the same wavelength carry n times that energy. If the cavity is at its ground (minimal) energy level, we
say that there are “no photons” in the cavity and denote the state as |0〉F—the vacuum state. The convention
is to denote only those modes that are potentially populated, so if we can find n photons in one mode, and
no photons in any other mode, we write, |n〉F. If two modes are populated by na and nb photons, and all
other modes are surely empty, we write |na, nb〉F (or |m,n〉Fab). When there is no danger of confusion, and
the number of photons per mode is small (smaller than ten), we just write |mn〉F for m photons in one mode
and n in the other. In addition to its wavelength, a photon also has a property called polarization, and a
basis for that property is, for instance, the horizontal and vertical polarizations mentioned earlier. Thus, two
modes (in a cavity) can also have the same energy, but different polarizations.
Outside a cavity photons travel with the speed of light, say from Alice to Bob, yet modes can still be
described, e.g., by using “pulses” of light [14]. The modes can then be distinguished by different directions
of the light beams (or by different paths), or by the timing of pulses (these modes are denoted by non-
overlapping time-bins), or by orthogonal polarizations.
A proper description of a photonic qubit is commonly based on using two modes ‘a’ and ‘b’ which are
populated by exactly a single photon, namely, a photon in mode a, so the state is |10〉Fab, or a photon in
mode b, so the state is |01〉Fab. However, a quantum space that consists of a single given photonic mode ‘a’
is not restricted to a single photon, and can be populated by any number of photons. A basis for this space
is {|n〉Fa} with n ≥ 0, so that the quantum space is infinitely large, H∞. Theoretically, a general state in this
space is can be written as the superposition
∑∞
n=0 cn|n〉Fa, with
∑
n |cn|2 = 1, cn ∈ C. Similarly, a quantum
space that consists of two photonic modes has the basis states |na, nb〉F, for na, nb ≥ 0 and a general state
is of the form
∑∞
na,nb=0
cna,nb |na, nb〉F with
∑∞
na,nb=0
|cna,nb |2 = 1, cna,nb ∈ C. This quantum space is
described as a tensor product of two “systems” H∞ ⊗H∞.
Using exactly two photons in two different (and orthogonal) modes assists in clarifying the difference
between photons and dust particles (or grains of sand): Due to the indistiguishability of photons, only 3
different states can exist (instead of 4): |20〉Fab, |02〉Fab and |11〉Fab. The last state has one photon in mode
‘a’ and another photon in ‘b’, however, exchanging the photons is meaningless since one can never tell one
photon from another.
A realistic model of a photon source (in a specific mode) is of a coherent pulse (a Poissonian distribution)
|α〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉
including terms that describe the possibility of emitting any number n of photons. As the number of photons
increases beyond some number, the probability decreases, so it is common to neglect the higher orders.
In QKD, experimentalists commonly use a “weak” coherent state (such that |α|  1) and then terms
with n ≥ 3 can usually be neglected. There is also a lot of research about sources that emit (to a good
approximation) single photons, and then, again, terms with n ≥ 3 can usually be neglected.
4.2 Alice’s realistic photonic space
While the theoretical qubit lives in H2, a realistic view defines the space actually used by Alice to be much
larger. The possibility to emit empty pulses increases Alice’s realistic space into H3, due to the vacuum
state |00〉Fab. When Alice sends a qubit using two modes, using a weak coherent state (or a “single-photon”
source), her realistic space,HA, is embedded inH∞⊗H∞. Terms containing more than two photons can be
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neglected, so these are excluded from Alice’s space HA. The appropriate realistic quantum space of Alice,
HA, is now a quhexit: the six-dimensional space spanned by χ6 = {|00〉F, |10〉F, |00〉F, |11〉F, |20〉F, |02〉F}.
The PNS attack demonstrated in Section 5.1, is based on attacking this 6 dimensional space HA. Note also
that terms with more than two photons still appear in M , and thus could potentially appear in the QSoP (and
then used by Eve).
At times, Alice’s realistic space is even larger, due to extra modes that are sent through the channel, and
are not meant to be a part of the protocol. These extra modes might severely compromise the security of
the protocol, since they might carry some vital information about the protocol. A specific QSA based on
that flaw is the “tagging attack” (Section 5.2). Note that even if Alice uses exactly two modes, the quantum
space M where HA is embedded, certainly contains other modes as well.
4.3 Extensions of the photonic space; the QSoP
Let us discuss Bob’s measurement of photonic spaces. There are (mainly) two types of detectors that can
be used. The common detector can not distinguish a single photon from more than one photon (these kind
of detectors are known as threshold detectors). The Hilbert space where Bob’s measurement is defined
is infinite9, since a click in the detector tells Bob that the number of photons occupying the mode is “not
zero” i.e. the detector clicks when |n〉F is detected, for n ≥ 1. This means that Bob measures the state
|0〉F, or he measures |1〉F, |2〉F, . . . but then “forgets” how many photons were detected. Bob might severely
compromise the security, since he inevitably interprets a measurement of a state containing multiple photons
as the “legal” state that contains only a single photon. An attack based on a similar limitation is the “Trojan-
Pony” attack described below, in Section 5.3. In order to avoid false interpretations of the photon number
reaching the detector, Bob could use an enhanced type of detector known as the photon-number resolving
detector or a counter (which is still under development). This device distinguishes a single photon from
n ≥ 2 photons, hence any eavesdropping attempt that generates multi-photon states can potentially be
noticed by Bob. A much enhanced security can be achieved now, although the QSoP is infinite also in this
case, due to identifying correctly the legitimate state |1〉F, from various legitimate states.
The number of modes in the QSoP depends on Bob’s detectors as well. Bob commonly increases the
number of measured modes by “opening” his detector for more time-bin modes or more frequency modes.
For instance, suppose Bob is using a detector whose detection time-window is quite larger than the width of
the pulse used in the protocol, since he does not know when exactly Alice’s pulse might arrive. The result is
an extension of the space used by Alice, so that the QSoP includes the subspace of M that contains all these
measured modes. When a single detector is used to measure more than one mode without distinguishing
them, the impact on the security might be severe, see the “Fake state” attack (Section 5.4).
In addition to the known attacks described in the following subsection, a new QSA is analyzed in Sec-
tion 6, where we examine the more general case of QSA, in which Bob adds an ancilla during the process.
5 Known Attacks as Quantum-Space Attacks
All known attacks can be considered as special cases of the Quantum-Space Attack. In this section we show
a description of several such attacks using QSA terms. For each and every attack we briefly describe the
specific protocol used, the quantum space of the protocol, and a realization of the attack as a QSA.
9 In practice, that space is as large as Eve might wish it to be. We can ignore the case where Eve uses too many photons so that
the detector could burn due to the high energy, since it is not in Eve’s interest. Thus, in some of the analyses below we replace∞
by some large number L.
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5.1 The photon number splitting attack [13]
The Protocol. Consider a BB84 protocol, where Alice uses a “weak pulse” laser to send photons in two
modes corresponding to the vertical and horizontal polarizations when using the z basis (the diagonal po-
larizations then relate to using the x basis). Bob uses a device called a Pockel cell to rotate the polarization
(by 45◦) for measuring the x basis, or performs no rotation if measuring the z basis. The measurement of
the state is then done using two detectors and a “polarization beam splitter” that passes the first mode to one
detector and the second mode to the other detector (for a survey of polarization-based QKD experiments,
see [23, 17]).
The Quantum Space of the Protocol. Every pulse sent by Alice is in one of four states, each in a
superposition of the 6 orthogonal states χ6 = {|00〉F, |10〉F, |01〉F,|11〉F,|20〉F, |02〉F}, where the space used by
Alice is HA = H6. Bob uses two setups, UBz = I for the z basis, and UBx for the x basis, which is more
complex and described in Appendix A.1.
The detectors used by Bob cannot distinguish between modes having single photon and multiple pho-
tons. Each one of his two detectors measures the basis elements {|n〉F} for n ≥ 0 (of the specific mode
directed to that specific detector), where Bob interprets the states {|n〉F} with n > 1 as measuring the state
|1〉F of the same mode. Bob’s measured space HB is thus infinite and spanned by the states {|mn〉F} for
m,n ≥ 0. The QSoP HP is equal to HBz (= HBx) since performing U−1 does not change the dimension-
ality of the spanned space (in both setups).
The Attack. Eve measures the number of photons in the pulse, using non-demolition measurement. If
she finds that the number of photons is ≥ 1, she blocks the pulse and generates a loss. In the case she finds
that the pulse consists of 2 photons, she splits one photon out of the pulse and sends it to Bob, keeping
the other photon until the bases are revealed, thus getting full information of the key-bit. Eve sends the
eavesdropped qubits to Bob via a lossless channel so that Bob will not notice the enhanced loss-rate. As
is common in experimental QKD, Bob is willing to accept a high loss-rate (he does not count losses as
errors), since most of Alice’s pulses are empty. See the precise mathematical description of this attack in
Appendix A.
5.2 The tagging attack (based on [24])
The Protocol. Consider a BB84 QKD protocol in which Alice sends an enlarged state rather than a qubit.
This state contains, besides the information qubit, a tag giving Eve some information about the bit. The
tag can, for example, tell Eve the basis being used by Alice. For a potentially realistic example, let the tag
be an additional qutrit indicating if Alice used the x-basis, or the z-basis, or whether the basis is unknown:
whenever Alice switches basis, a single photon comes out of her lab prior to the qubit-carrying pulse, telling
the basis, say using the states |10〉Ftag and |01〉Ftag, and when there is no change of basis, what comes out prior
to the qubit is just the vacuum |00〉Ftag.
The Quantum Space of the Protocol. In this example, Alice is using the space HA = H2 ⊗ Htag =
H2 ⊗ H3. Bob, unaware of the enlarged space used by Alice, expects and receives only the subspace H2.
We assume that Bob ideally measures this space with a single setup UB = I , therefore HB = H2. Since
Bob’s setup does not change the space, HB
−1
= H2 as well. However, the tag is of a much use to Eve, and
indeed the QSoP following Definition 5, defined to be HP = H2 ⊗Htag.
The Attack. Eve uses the tag in order to retrieve information about the qubit without inducing error
(e.g. via cloning the qubit in the proper basis). The attack is then an intercept-resend QSA. We mention that
this attack is very similar to a side-channel cryptanalysis of classic cryptosystems.
A Short Summery. It can be seen that the PNS attack described above is actually a special case of
the tagging attack, where the tag in that case is in fact another copy of the transmitted qubit. This copy
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is kept by Eve until the bases are revealed, then it can be measured so the the key-bit value is exposed
with certainty. Both those QSA attacks are based on the fact that Alice (realistic) space is larger than the
theoretical one. Although in the PNS example, the QSoP is further extended due to Bob’s measurement, the
attack is not based on that extension but on the fact thatHA is larger thanH2. In the following attacks Bob’s
measurements cause the enlargement of the QSoP, allowing Eve to exploit the larger QSoP for her attack.
5.3 The Trojan-pony attack [24, 26]
In Trojan-pony attacks Eve modifies the state sent to Bob in a way that gives her information. In contrast to
a “Trojan-horse” that goes in-and-out of Bob’s lab, the “pony” only goes in, therefore, it is not considered
an attack on the lab, but only on the channel. We present here an interesting example [24].
The Protocol. Assume a polarization-encoded BB84 protocol, in which Alice is ideal, namely, sending
perfect qubits (HA = H2). However, Bob uses realistic threshold detectors that suffer from losses and dark
counts, and that cannot distinguish between one photon and k photons for 1 < k < L. In order to be able
to “prove” security, for a longer distance of transmission Bob wants to keep the error-rate low although the
increase of dark counts’ impact with the distance [13]. Therefore, Bob assumes that Eve has no control
over dark counts, and whenever both detectors click, Alice and Bob agree to consider it as a loss since it
is outside of Eve’s control (i.e. the QSoP is falsely considered to be H2). Namely, they assume that an
error occurs only when Bob measures in the right basis, and only one detector clicks, (which is the detector
corresponding to the wrong bit-value).
The Quantum Space of the Protocol. Same as in Section 5.1, Bob’s measured spaces HBz , HBx ,
the reversed space HB
−1
as well as the QSoP HP , are merely the spaces describing two modes (with
up to L photons), HL ⊗ HL. Bob’s detectors cannot distinguish between receiving a single-photon pulse
from a multi-photon pulse, so his measurement is properly described as a projection of the received state
onto the space containing {|ij〉F} followed by “forgetting” the exact result, and keeping only one of three
results: “{10} ≡ detector-1 clicks”, “{01} ≡ detector-2 clicks”, and else it is {00}, a “loss”. In formal,
generalized-measurements language (called POVM, see [39, 37]) these three possible results are written as:
{10} ≡ ∑L−1k=1 |k0〉F F〈k0|, {01} ≡ ∑L−1k=1 |0k〉F F〈0k|, {00} ≡ |00〉F F〈00| + ∑L−1k1,k2 =1 |k1k2〉F F〈k1k2|, and
their sum is the identity matrix.
The Attack. Eve’s attack is the following: (a) Randomly choose a basis (b) Measure the arriving qubit
in that specific chosen basis (c) Send Bob m-photons identical to the measured qubit, where m  1.
Obviously, when Eve chooses the same basis as Alice and Bob then Bob measures the exact value sent by
Alice, and Eve gets full information. Otherwise, both of his detectors click, implying a “loss”, except for a
negligible probability,≈ 2(−m+1), thus Eve induces no errors. The main observation of this measure-resend
QSA is that treating a count of more than a single photon as a loss, rather than as an error, is usually not
justified. A second conclusion is that letting Bob use counters instead of threshold detectors (to distinguish a
single photon from multiple photons), together with treating any count of more than one photon as an error,
could be vital for proving security against QSA. The price is that dark counts put severe restrictions on the
distance to which communication can still be considered secure, as suggested already by [13].
5.4 The fake-state attack (based on [34, 31])
The Protocol. In this example, we examine a polarization encoded BB84 protocol, and an ideal Alice
(HA = H2). This time Bob’s detectors are imperfect so that their detection windows do not fully overlap,
meaning that there exist times in which one detector is blocked (or it has a low efficiency), while the other
detector is still regularly active. Thus, if Eve can control the precise timing of the pulse, she can control
whether the photon will be detected or lost. The setup is built four detectors and a rotating mirror (since
Bob does not want to spend money on a Pockel cell (polarization rotator), he actually uses 2 fixed different
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setups). Using the rotating mirror Bob sends the photon into a detection setup for basis z or a detection
setup for basis x. Suppose the two detection setups use slightly different detectors, or slightly different
delay lines, or slightly different shutters, and Eve is aware of this (or had learnt it during her past attacks
on the system). For simplicity, we model the non-overlapping detection windows, as additional two modes,
one slightly prior to Alice’s intended mode (the pulse), and one right after it.
The Quantum Space of the Protocol. The original qubit is sent in a specific time-bin t0 (namely,
HA = H2). The setup UZ is a set of two detectors and a polarized beam splitter, separating the horizontal
and the vertical modes to the detectors, where Ux separate the diagonal modes into a set of two (different)
detectors. Let the detectors for one basis, say z, be able to measure a pulse arriving at t0 or t1, while the
detectors for the other basis (x) measure pulses arriving at t−1 or t0.
For simplicity, we degenerate the space to contain one or less photons10, so that HBz is H5, i.e. two
possible time-bins consisting each of two (polarization) modes of one or less photons. The measured space
of the x-setup has two possible time-bins and two possible polarization modes, thus HBx = H5 as well,
however, the two time-bins for this setup are t0 and t1. Following Definition 4 we get that that the reversed
spaceHB
−1
contains three time-bins (t−1, t0 and t1) with two polarization modes in each, thereforeHB
−1
=
H7, under the single-photon assumption. The QSoP, following Definition 5 equals HB
−1
since HA ⊂
HB
−1
.
The Attack. Eve exploit the larger space by sending “fake” states using the external time bins (t−1 and
t1). Eve randomly chooses a basis, measures the qubit sent by Alice, and sends Bob the same polarization
state she found, but at t−1 if she have used the x basis, or at t1 if she have used the z basis. Since no ancilla
is kept by Eve, this is an intercept-resend QSA.
Bob will get the same result as Eve if he uses the same basis, or a loss otherwise. The mathematical de-
scription of the attack is as follows: Eve can generate superpositions of states of the form |Vt−1Ht−1Vt0Ht0Vt1Ht1〉F,
where the index {H,V } denotes this mode has Vertical or Horizontal polarization, and its subscript denotes
the time-bin of the mode. Eve’s measure-resend attack is described as measuring Alice’s qubit in the x basis,
creating a new copy of the measured qubit, and performing the transformation (|001000〉F → |100000〉F);
(|000100〉F → |010000〉F) or as performing a measurement in the z basis, and performing the transformation
(|001000〉F → |000010〉F); (|000100〉F → |000001〉F) on the generated copy.
A short summery We see that Eve can “force” a desired value (or a loss) on Bob, thus gaining all
the information while inducing no errors (but increasing the loss rate). Bob can use a shutter to block the
irrelevant time-bins but such a shutter could generate a similar problem in the frequency domain. This attack
is actually a special case of the Trojan-pony attack, in which the imperfections of Bob’s detectors allow Eve
to send states that will be un-noticed unless the measured basis equals to Eve’s chosen basis.
6 Interferometric BB84 and 6-state Protocols
In order to demonstrate the power of QSA, and to see its advantages, this section presents a partial security
analysis of some interferometric BB84 and 6-state schemes. Interferometric schemes are more common than
any other type of implementation in QKD experiments [43, 32, 23, 18, 17, 33] and products [48, 49]. In
this section we define the specific equipment used by Bob, and we formulate UB and Bob’s measurements.
We then find the spaces HA, HBj , HB
−1
and the QSoP, HP . Finally, we demonstrate a novel attack which
is found to be very successful against a specific variant of the BB84 interferometric scheme; this specific
QSA, which we call the “reversed-space attack”, is designed using the tools developed in Sections 2 and 3.
10As mentioned above, this is used for non-security proof, and is not legitimate assumption for proving unconditional security,
where the three time-modes should be considered as HL ⊗HL ⊗HL.
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6.1 Bob’s equipment
We begin with a description of interferometric (BB84 and six-state) schemes, which is based on sending
phase-encoded qubits arriving in two time-separated modes [43, 32]. Alice encodes her qubit using two
time-bins t′0 and t′1, where a photon in the first mode, |10〉Ft′0t′1 , represents the state |0z〉, and a photon in the
other mode, |01〉Ft′0t′1 , represents |1z〉. The BB84 protocol of [43, 32] (and many others) uses the x and y
bases, meaning that Alice (ideally) sends one of the following four states: |0x〉 = (|10〉Ft′0t′1 + |01〉
F
t′0t
′
1
)/
√
2;
|1x〉 = (|10〉Ft′0t′1 − |01〉
F
t′0t
′
1
)/
√
2; |0y〉 = (|10〉Ft′0t′1 + i|01〉
F
t′0t
′
1
)/
√
2; and |1y〉 = (|10〉Ft′0t′1 − i|01〉
F
t′0t
′
1
)/
√
2.
Bob uses an interferometer built from two beam splitters with one short path and one long path (Fig-
ure 1). A pulse of light travels through the short arm of the interferometer in Tshort seconds, and through
the long arm in Tlong = Tshort + ∆T seconds, where ∆T is also precisely the time separation between
the two arriving modes of the qubit, ∆T = t′1 − t′0. A controlled phase shifter Pφ, is placed in the long
arm of the interferometer. It performs a phase shift by a given phase φ, i.e. Pφ(|ψ〉) = eiφ|ψ〉. The
phase shifter is set to φ = 0 (φ = pi/2) when Bob measures the x (y) basis. Each beam splitter interferes
two input arms (modes 1, 2) into two output arms (modes 3, 4), in the following way (for a single photon):
|10〉F1,2 7→ 1√2 |10〉F3,4+
i√
2
|01〉F3,4, and |01〉F1,2 7→ i√2 |10〉F3,4+
1√
2
|01〉F3,4. The photon is transmitted/reflected
with a probability of 50%; The transmitted part keeps the same phase as the incoming photon, while the re-
flected part gets an extra phase of eipi/2, if it carries a single photon. When a single mode, carrying at least a
single photon, enters a beam splitter from one arm, and nothing enters the other input arm, we must consider
the other entry to be an additional mode (an ancilla) in a vacuum state.
When a single mode (carrying one or more photons) enters the interferometer at time t′0, see Figure 1, it
yields two modes at time t0 due to traveling through the short arm, and two modes at time t1 due to traveling
through the long arm. Those four output modes are: times t0, t1 in the ‘s’ (straight) arm of the interferometer,
and times t0, t1 in the ‘d’ (down) arm. A basis state in this Fock space is then |ns0 , ns1 , nd0 , nd1〉F. In the
case of having that single mode carrying exactly a single photon, the transformation, which requires three
additional empty ancillas11, is |1〉Ft′0 |000〉
F 7→ (|1000〉F− |0100〉F + i|0010〉F + i|0001〉F) /2. Note that a pulse
which is sent at a different time (say, t′x) results in the same output state, but with the appropriate delays, i.e.
|1〉Ft′x |000〉F 7→ (|1000〉F − |0100〉F + i|0010〉F + i|0001〉F) /2, (5)
where the resulting state is defined in the Fock space whose basis states are |nsx , nsx+1 , ndx , ndx+1〉.
Let us now examine any superposition of two modes (t′0 and t′1) that enter the interferometer one after
the other, with exactly the same time difference ∆T as the difference lengths of the arms. The state evolves
in the following way (see Appendix B.2):
cos θ|10〉Ft′0t′1 |0000〉
F + sin θeiϕ|01〉Ft′0t′1 |0000〉
F 7→(
cos θ|100000〉FB + (− cos θeiφ + sin θeiϕ)|010000〉FB − sin θei(ϕ+φ)|001000〉FB
+ i cos θ|000100〉FB + i(cos θeiφ + sin θeiϕ)|000010〉FB + i sin θei(ϕ+φ)|000001〉FB
)
/2 (6)
describing the evolution for any possible BB84 state sent by Alice (|0x〉, |1x〉, |0y〉, |1y〉 determined by the
value of ϕ = 0, pi, pi2 ,
3pi
2 respectively, when θ =
pi
4 ). As a result of this precise timing, these two modes are
transformed into a superposition of 6 possible modes (and not 8 modes) at the outputs, due to interference
at the second beam splitter. Only four vacuum-states ancillas (and not six) are required for that process. The
resulting 6 modes are t0, t1, t2 in the ‘s’ arm and in the ‘d’ arm of the interferometer. Denote this Fock
space as HB , with basis elements |ns0 , ns1 , ns2 , nd0 , nd1 , nd2〉FB .
11See a brief description in Appendix B.1.
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The measurement is performed as follows: Bob opens his detectors at time t1 in both output arms of
the interferometer. A click in the “down” direction means measuring the bit-value 0, while a click in the
“straight” direction means 1. The other modes are commonly considered as a loss (they are not measured)
since they give an inconclusive result regarding the original qubit. We refer this BB84 variant as “xy-BB84”.
One might want to use the z basis in his QKD protocol (using ϕ = 0, and θ = 0 or θ = pi2 ), for instance,
in order to avoid the need for a controlled phase shifter or for another equipment-related reason, or in order
to perform “QKD with classical Bob” [11]. A potentially more important reason might be to perform the
6-state QKD [15, 3, 29] protocol, due to its improved immunity against errors (27.4% errors versus only
20% in BB84 [16]). A possible and easy to implement variant for realizing a measurement in the z basis is
the following: Bob uses the setup UBx (i.e. he sets Pφ to φ = 0), and opens his detectors at times t0 and
t2, corresponding to the bit-values 0 and 1 respectively (See Equation (6)). Unfortunately, technological
limitations, e.g. of telecommunication wavelength (IR) detectors, might make it difficult for Bob to open
his detectors for more than a single detection window per pulse. Bob could perform a measurement of just
the states {|000100〉FB, |001000〉FB}, opening the d arm detector at time t0 (to measure |0z〉) and the s arm
detector at time t2 (to measure |1z〉). We refer this variant as “xyz-six-state”.
6.2 The quantum space of the interferometric protocols
We assume Alice to be almost ideal, having the realistic space HA = H3 (a qubit or a vacuum state), using
two time-bin modes. As we have seen, four ancillary modes in vacuum states are added to each transmission.
Therefore, the interferometer setups UBx and UBy transform the 2-mode states of HA into a subspace that
resides in the 6 modes space HB . For simplicity, we assume that Eve does not generate n-photon states,
with n ≥ 2, so we can ignore high photon numbers in the HB space12. Therefore, we redefine HB = H7,
the space spanned by the vacuum, and the six single-photon terms in each of the above modes.
Using the x and y bases, Bob measures only time-bin t1, so his actual measured spaces consist of two
modes: time-bin t1 in the ‘s’ arm and the ‘d’ arm. In that case, the measured spaces areHBx = HBy = H3,
spanned by the states {|000000〉FB , |010000〉FB , |000010〉FB}. When Bob uses the z basis, he measures two
different modes, so HBz is spanned by the states {|000000〉FB , |000100〉FB , |001000〉FB}.
Let us define the appropriate space HB
−1
for the 6-state protocol, according to Definition 8. The
space HB
−1
is spanned by the states given by performing U ∈ {UBx ,UBy} on {|000000〉FB , |010000〉FB ,
|000010〉FB}, as well as the states given by performing UBz on {|000000〉FB , |000100〉FB , |001000〉FB}. In-
terestingly, once applying U−1, the resulting states are embedded in an 8-mode space defined by the two
incoming arms of the interferometer, ‘a’ (from Alice) and ‘b’ (from Bob), at time bins t′−1, t′0, t′1, and t′2.
The basis states of HB
−1
are listed in Appendix B.3.
Following Definition 9, the QSoPHP of this implementation for the 6-state protocol, is the subsystem of
HB
−1
which is controlled by Eve. It is spanned by the 8-mode states spanning HB
−1
after tracing out Bob.
The space that contains those “traced-out” states has only four modes that are controlled by Eve, specifically,
input ‘a’ of the interferometer at times t′−1 to t′2, having a basis state of the form |at′−1at′0at′1at′2〉FP . Given
the single-photon restriction, we getHP = H5, namely, the space spanned by the vacuum state, and a single
photon in each of the four modes, i.e. {|0000〉FP , |1000〉FP , |0100〉FP , |0010〉FP , |0001〉FP }. This same result is
obtained also if Bob measures all the six modes in HB .
Bob might want to see how the basis states of the 4-mode QSoP, HP , evolve through the interferometer
in order to place detectors on the resulting modes, which will be used to identify Eve’s attack. It is interesting
to note, that those basis states result in 10 different non-empty modes (!). If Bob measures all these modes,
he increases the QSoP, and maybe allows Eve to attack a larger space, and so on and so forth. Therefore, in
order to perform a security analysis, one must first fix the scheme and only then assess the QSoP. Otherwise,
12As mentioned in Section 2, this assumption is not legitimate when proving unconditional security of a protocol.
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a “ping-pong” effect might increase the spaces’ dimensions to infinity. A similar, yet reversed logic, hints
that it could actually be better for Bob, in terms of the simplicity of the analysis for the “xy-BB84” scheme,
to measure just the two modes at t1 (i.e. the space spanned by |0, ns1 , 0, 0, nd1 , 0〉FB), thus reducing the QSoP
to a 2-mode space, HP = HA, see Appendix B.4. Although Eve is allowed to attack a larger space than this
two-mode HP , she has no advantage in doing so: pulses that enter the interferometer on different modes
(i.e. other time-bins than t′0 and t′1), never interfere with the output pulses of time-bin t1 measured by Bob.
Therefore, state occupying different modes can not be distinguished from the states in which those modes
are empty.
6.3 The “Reversed-Space” attack on interferometric protocols
Consider a BB84 variant in which Bob uses only the x and the z bases, using a single interferometer, where
the z-basis measurement is performed according to the description in the last few lines of Section 6.1. We
refer this variant as “xz-BB84”. The QSoP of this scheme, HP is the space described above for the “xyz-
six-state” protocol. The following attack
|0〉E |0100〉P UE−→12 |E0〉E
(|1000〉FP + |0100〉FP )+ 12 |E1〉E(|0010〉FP + |0001〉FP ) (7)
|0〉E |0010〉P UE−→12 |E1〉E
(−|1000〉FP + |0100〉FP )+ 12 |E0〉E(|0010〉FP − |0001〉FP ) (8)
which we call “the Reversed-Space Attack”, allows Eve to acquire information about the transmitted qubits,
without inducing any errors. The states |·〉E denote Eve’s ancilla which is not necessarily a photonic system.
The state |0z〉A ≡ |0100〉FP and |1z〉A ≡ |0010〉FP are the regular states send by Alice, where we added
the relevant extension of HA in HP . When |0z〉A is sent by Alice, the attacked state UE |0〉E |0z〉A reaches
Bob’s interferometer, and interferes in a way such that it can never reach Bob’s detector at time t2, i.e.
F〈001000|BUBx
(
(UE |0〉E |0z〉A) |0000〉FB′
)
= 0. Although the attacked state UE |0〉E |0z〉A reaches modes
that Alice’s original state |0z〉A can never reach, Bob never measures those modes, and cannot notice the
attack. A similar argument applies when Alice sends |1z〉A.
As for the x basis13, this attack satisfies
|0〉E |0x〉A 7→
1√
8
(|E0〉E + |E1〉E)(|0100〉FP + |0010〉FP ) +
1√
8
(|E0〉E − |E1〉E)(|1000〉FP − |0001〉FP ) (9)
|0〉E |1x〉A 7→
1√
8
(|E0〉E − |E1〉E)(|0100〉FP − |0010〉FP ) +
1√
8
(|E0〉E + |E1〉E)(|1000〉FP + |0001〉FP ). (10)
The first element in the sum results in the desired interference in Bob’s lab, while the second is not measured
by Bob’s detectors at time t1. By letting Eve’s probes |E0〉E and |E1〉E be orthogonal states, Eve gets a lot
of information while inducing no errors at all. Yet, we find that Eve is increasing the loss rate by this attack
to 87.5%, but a very high loss rate is anyhow expected by Bob (as explained in the analysis of the PNS [13]
and the tagging [24] attacks).
In conclusion, this attack demonstrates the risk of using various setups without giving full security
analysis for the specific setup. We are not familiar with any other security analysis that takes into account
the enlarged space generated by the inverse-transformation of Bob’s space.
13For simplicity we use the shorter notation |0x〉 ≡ (|0100〉FP + |0010〉F)/
√
2, etc.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have defined the QSA, a novel attack that generalizes all currently known attacks on the
channel. This new attack brings a new method for performing security analysis of protocols. The attack is
based on a realistic view of the quantum spaces involved, and in particular, the spaces that become larger
than the theoretical ones, due to practical considerations. Although this paper is explicitly focused on the
case of uni-directional implementations of a few schemes, its main observations and methods apply to any
uni-directional QKD protocol, to bi-directional QKD protocols, and maybe also to any realistic quantum
cryptography scheme beyond QKD.
The main conclusion of this research is that the quantum space which is attacked by Eve can be assessed,
given a proper understanding of the experimental limitations. This assessment requires a novel cryptanalysis
formalism — analyzing the states generated in Alice’s lab, as well as the states that are to be measured by
Bob (assessing them as if they go backwards in time from Bob’s lab); this type of analysis resembles the
two-time formalism in quantum theory [1, 44].
Open problems for further theoretical research include: 1.– Generalization of the QSA to other conven-
tional protocols (such as the two-state protocol, EPR-based protocols, d-level protocols, etc.); such a gen-
eralization should be rather straightforward. 2.– Proving unconditional security (or more limited security
results such as “robustness” [11]) against various QSAs. This is especially important for the interferometric
setup, where the QSoP is much larger than Alice’s six-dimensional space (the one spanned by χ6). 3.–
Describing the QSA for more complex protocols, such as two-way protocols [33, 10, 11] in which the quan-
tum communication is bi-directional, and protocols which use a larger set of states such as data-rejected
protocols [2] or decoy-state protocols [25, 45, 30, 47]. 4.– Extend the analysis and results to composable
QKD [4]. 5(a).– In some cases, if Bob uses “counters” and treats various measurement outcomes as er-
rors, the effective QSoP relevant for proving security is potentially much smaller than the QSoP defined
here. 5(b).– Adding counters on more modes increases the QSoP defined here, but might allow analysis of
a smaller “attack’s QSoP”, if those counters are used to identify Eve’s attack. More generally, the connec-
tion between the way Bob interprets his measured outcomes, and the “attack’s QSoP” is yet to be further
analyzed.
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Appendix
A Mathematical Description of the PNS attack
The PNS attack can be realized using (an infinite set of) polarization independent beams splitters. Eve uses
a beam splitter to split photons from Alice’s state. Using a non-demolition measurement Eve measures the
number of photons in one output of the beam splitter, and repeat the splitting until she acquires exactly one
photon. Formally UE is defined:
|00〉FE |02〉FA 7→ |01〉FE |01〉FP |00〉FE |10〉FA 7→ |10〉FE |00〉FP
|00〉FE |20〉FA 7→ |10〉FE |10〉FP |00〉FE |01〉FA 7→ |01〉FE |00〉FP
|00〉FE |11〉FA 7→ (|01〉FE |10〉FP + |10〉FE |01〉FA)/
√
2.
Whenever Alice sends a pulse with two photons of the same polarization, Eve and Bob end up, each, with
having a single photon of the original polarization.
Proposition 1. Eve’s PNS attack for a pulse of 2 photons, gives Eve full information while inducing no
errors.
Proof. According to its definition it is trivial to verify the attack for the horizontal and vertical polarizations
|0z〉(2) and |1z〉(2) (where |P 〉(k) means k photons having polarization P ). Using the standard creation
and annihilation operators (a† and a)14, we can write the state of two photons in the diagonal polarization
(x basis): |0x〉(2) =
(
1√
2
(a†1 + a
†
2)
)2 |00〉F = 12(|20〉F + √2|11〉F + |02〉F), similarly |1x〉(2) = 12(|20〉F −√
2|11〉F + |02〉F).
|00〉FE |0x〉(2)P ≡
1
2
|00〉FE
(|20〉F +√2|11〉F + |02〉F)
P
UE−→ 1
2
(|10〉FE |10〉FP + |01〉FE |10〉FP + |10〉FE |01〉FP + |01〉FE |01〉FP )
=
1
2
(
(|10〉FE + |01〉FE)|10〉FP + (|10〉FE + |01〉FE)|01〉FP
)
=
1
2
(|10〉FE + |01〉FE)(|10〉FP + |01〉FP )
≡ |0x〉E |0x〉(1)P
|00〉FE |1x〉(2)P ≡
1
2
|00〉FE
(|20〉F −√2|11〉F + |02〉F)
P
UE−→ 1
2
(|10〉FE |10〉FP − |01〉FE |10〉FP − |10〉FE |01〉FP + |01〉FE |01〉FP )
=
1
2
(
(|10〉FE − |01〉FE)|10〉FP − (|10〉FE − |01〉FE)|01〉FP
)
=
1
2
(|10〉FE − |01〉FE)(|10〉FP − |01〉FP )
≡ |1x〉E |1x〉(1)P
Which completes the proof.
14 See any quantum optics book, e.g. [41]
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A.1 Polarization change
A Polarization based QKD protocol makes a use of a Pockel cell (UBx), rotating the polarization of the
photons going through it. For a single photon, its action is trivial,
|10〉F UBx−→ 1√
2
(|10〉F + |01〉F) , and
|01〉F UBx−→ 1√
2
(|10〉F − |01〉F) .
(11)
For a state that contains multiple photons, the transformation is not intuitive, and most simply defined using
the creation and annihilation operators. In a somewhat simplified way, the Pokcel cell can be considered as
performing a†1 7→
(
1√
2
(a†1 + a
†
2)
)
and a†2 7→
(
1√
2
(a†1 − a†2)
)
, so that a state is transformed in the following
way
|nm〉F =
(
a†1
)n(
a†2
)m|00〉F UBx−→ ( 1√
2
(a†1 + a
†
2)
)n( 1√
2
(a†1 − a†2)
)m
|00〉F. (12)
B QSoP of the Interferometeric Scheme: Supplementary Information
B.1 A (brief) graphical description of pulses evolution through interferometer
See Figure 2 for evolution of a single occupied mode through the interferometer, and Figure 3 for evolution
of two superpositioned modes.
B.2 Evolution of modes through the interferometer
In order to simplify the analysis (a simplification that is not allowed when proving the full security of
a scheme) we look at the ideal case in which exactly one photon (or none) is sent by Alice. The ba-
sis states are then the vacuum |000000〉FB ≡ |V 〉FB , and the six states (that we denote for simplicity by)
|100000〉FB ≡ |s0〉FB; |010000〉FB ≡ |s1〉FB; |001000〉FB ≡ |s2〉FB; |000100〉FB ≡ |d0〉FB; |000010〉FB ≡ |d1〉FB
and |000001〉FB ≡ |d2〉FB .
The full transformation of a single photon pulse through the interferometer is given by Equation (5).
Alice sends photons at time bins t′0 and t′1 only, so the interferometer transformation on Alice’s basis states
is |00〉FA|0000〉FBˆ 7→ |V 〉FB , and
|10〉FA|0000〉FBˆ 7→ (|s0〉FB − eiφ|s1〉FB + i|d0〉FB + ieiφ|d1〉FB) /2
|01〉FA|0000〉Bˆ 7→ (|s1〉FB − eiφ|s2〉FB + i|d1〉FB + ieiφ|d2〉FB) /2 ,
(13)
where |0000〉Bˆ denotes ancilla added during the process15. Equation 13 can be used to describe the interfer-
ometer effect on a general qubit, shown in Equation (6).
The states sent by Alice during the “xy-BB84” protocol evolve in the interferometer as follows:
|0x〉A φ=0−→ (|s0〉FB − |s2〉FB + i|d0〉FB + 2i|d1〉FB + i|d2〉FB) /
√
8
|1x〉A φ=0−→ (|s0〉FB − 2|s1〉FB + |s2〉FB + i|d0〉FB − i|d2〉B) /
√
8
|0y〉A φ=pi/2−→ (|s0〉FB + |s2〉FB + i|d0〉FB − 2|d1〉FB − i|d2〉FB) /
√
8
|1y〉A φ=pi/2−→ (|s0〉FB − 2i|s1〉FB − |s2〉FB + i|d0〉FB + i|d2〉FB) /
√
8
(14)
15Those ancillas (the space HBˆ) are originated by Alice extended space HP and by Bob (HB
′
). Performing U−1 reveals the
exact origin of those ancillas.
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Bob can distinguish the computation basis elements of bases x and y, measuring time-bin t1, i.e. the states
|d1〉F for |0〉 and |s1〉F for |1〉 in the measured basis. Other states give Bob no information about the state sent
by Alice.
B.3 HB−1 of the “xyz-six-state” scheme
Let Bob be using interferometric setups UBx and measuring 6 modes (corresponding the space with a basis
state |ns0ns1ns2nd0nd1nd2〉FB) with one or less photons. Following Definition 8, the states spanning the
space HB
−1
can be derived using Equation (6) (adjusted to the appropriate space):
|000000〉FB
U−1Bx−→ |00000000〉FPB′
|010000〉FB
U−1Bx−→ 1
2
(−|01000000〉FPB′ + |00100000〉FPB′ − i|00000100〉FPB′ − i|00000010〉FPB′)
|000010〉FB
U−1Bx−→ 1
2
(−i|01000000〉FPB′ − i|00100000〉FPB′ + |00000100〉FPB′ − |00000010〉FPB′)
|000000〉FB
U−1Bz−→ |00000000〉FPB′
|001000〉FB
U−1Bz−→ 1
2
(−|00100000〉FPB′ + |00010000〉FPB′ − i|00000010〉FPB′ − i|00000001〉FPB′)
|000100〉FB
U−1Bz−→ 1
2
(−i|10000000〉FPB′ − i|01000000〉FPB′ + |00001000〉FPB′ − |00000100〉FPB′)
|000000〉FB
U−1By−→ |00000000〉FPB′
|010000〉FB
U−1By−→ 1
2
(i|01000000〉FPB′ + |00100000〉FPB′ − |00000100〉FPB′ − i|00000010〉FPB′)
|000010〉FB
U−1By−→ 1
2
(−|01000000〉FPB′ − i|00100000〉FPB′ − i|00000100〉FPB′ − |00000010〉FPB′) (15)
defined over the space HP ⊗ HB′ with basis state |at′−1at′0at′1at′2bt′−1bt′0bt′1bt′2〉FPB′ . Note that performing
U−1 requires an additional ancilla, since the modes number increases from six to eight.
B.4 QSoP of the “xy-BB84” scheme
Assume Bob measures only time-bin t1 in both output arms of the interferometer, i.e. the measured space is
HB subspace spanned by |0, ns1 , 0, 0, nd1 , 0〉FB . Assuming a single-photon restriction, the reversed space,
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of that measured space that is spanned by:
|000000〉FB
U−1Bx−→ |0000〉FPB′
|010000〉FB
U−1Bx−→ 1
2
(−|1000〉FPB′ + |0100〉FPB′ − i|0010〉FPB′ − i|0001〉FPB′)
|000010〉FB
U−1Bx−→ 1
2
(−i|1000〉FPB′ − i|0100〉FPB′ + |0010〉FPB′ − |0001〉FPB′)
|000000〉FB
U−1By−→ |0000〉FPB′
|010000〉FB
U−1By−→ 1
2
(i|1000〉PB′ + |0100〉FPB′ − |0010〉FPB′ − i|0001〉FPB′)
|000010〉FB
U−1By−→ 1
2
(−|1000〉FPB′ − i|0100〉FPB′ − i|0010〉FPB′ − |0001〉FPB′) (16)
as can be verified using Equation (6). The space HB
−1
is embedded in a 4-mode space HP ⊗HB′ , having
the basis element |at′0at′1bt′0bt′1〉FPB′ , i.e. Alice modes at times t′0 and t′1 and Bob’s added ancillary modes at
times t′0 and t′1 respectively. The resulting six states (16) span a 4-dimensional space, i.e. HB
−1
= H4. The
QSoP in this special case is HP = H3, spanned by |at′0at′1〉F with one or less photons.
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t' 0t' 1
(a) s-Arm
d-Arm
t 0t 1t 2
t 2
t 1
t 0
Bob's Lab
(b)
( c ) ( d )
( e )
P
Figure 1: Bob’s laboratory setup for the x and y basis. (a) Alice sends a qubit; (b) Vacuum states are added
in the interferometer; (c), (d) beam-splitters; (e) phase shifter Pφ.
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(1)
s-Arm
d-Arm
(2)
(a) Time T0: the pulse (1) is about to enter the interferom-
eter. A vacuum ancilla (2) is added in the input of the first
beam splitter.
(4)
s-Arm
d-Arm
(3)
(3')
(b) Time T1: Pulses (1) and (2) interfere and become a su-
perposition of (3) and (3’) in the short and long arms of
the interferometer, respectively, |1〉1|0〉2 BS−→ (|1〉3|0〉3′ +
i|0〉3|1〉3′)/
√
2. Pulse (3) is about to enter the second beam
splitter so a vacuum ancilla is added (4).
(3')
s-Arm
d-Arm
(5)
(5')
( 6 )
(c) Time T2: pulses (5) and (5’) are created by pulses (3)
and (4), 1√
2
|0〉4|1〉3 BS−→ (i|1〉5|0〉5′ + |0〉5|1〉5′)/2. Pulse
(3’) is about to enter the second beam-splitter so a vacuum
ancilla is added (6).
( 7 )
s-Arm
d-Arm
( 7 ')
( 5 )
( 5 ')
(d) Time T3: Pulses (7) and (7’) are created by interfering
(3’) and (6). i√
2
|1〉3′ |0〉6 BS−→ (i|1〉7|0〉7′ − |0〉7|1〉7′)/2.
Figure 2: Evolution in time of a single photon pulse through an interferometer satisfying
|1000〉1,2,4,6 Interferometer−→ (|1000〉5′,7′,5,7 − |0100〉5′,7′,5,7 + i|0010〉5′,7′,5,7 + i|0001〉5′,7′,5,7)/2. The num-
bers represent the appropriate mode number of each pulse. The input state (|1〉t0 |000〉) consists of modes
(1) for the pulse at t0 and (2), (4) and (6) for the vacuum ancillas. The output modes that correspond to the
state |ns0 , ns1 , nd0 , nd1〉 are modes (5’), (7’), (5) and (7) respectively.
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(1)
s-Arm
d-Arm
(2)
(1')
(2')
(a) Time T0: The general single-photon qubit (α|0〉+β|1〉)
is sent to Bob is in two modes (1) and (2). Bob adds two
vacuum ancillas (1’) and (2’) that interfere with the photon
in the first beam splitter (BS-1).
(2)
s-Arm
d-Arm
( 3 )(2')
( 3 ')
(4)
(b) Time T1: Modes (1) and (1’) interfere and create (3) and
(3’) in the short and long arm respectively, α|1〉1|0〉1′ BS−→
α√
2
(|1〉3|0〉3′ + i|0〉3|1〉3′). Pulse (3) is about to enter BS-2
so a vacuum ancilla is added (4).
( 6 ) s-Arm
d-Arm
( 3' )
( 5 )
( 5 ')
( 6 ')
(c) Time T2: Pulses (5) and (5’) are created by the in-
terference of (3) and (4) α√
2
|0〉4|1〉3 BS−→ iα2 |1〉5|0〉5′ +
α
2
|0〉5|1〉5′ . Pulses (6) and (6’) created by the interference
of (2) and (2’) in BS-1 β|1〉2|0〉2′ BS−→ β√2 (|1〉6|0〉6′ +
i|0〉6|1〉6′). .
( 7 )
s-Arm
d-Arm
( 7 ')
( 5 )
( 5 ')( 6 ')
( 8 )
(d) Time T3: Pulses (7) and (7’) are created by the interfer-
ence of (3’) and (6) in BS-2 iα√
2
|1〉3′ |0〉6+ β√2 |0〉3′ |1〉6
BS−→
i(α+β)
2
|1〉7|0〉7′ + β−α2 |0〉7|1〉7′ . Pulse (6’) is about to en-
ter BS-2 so a vacuum ancilla is added (8).
( 7 )
s-Arm
d-Arm
( 7 ')
( 5 )
( 5 ')( 9 ')
( 9 )
(e) Time T4: Pulses (9) and (9’) are created by the interfer-
ence of (6’) and (8) in BS-2 iβ√
2
|1〉6′ |0〉8 BS−→ iβ2 |1〉9|0〉9′−
β
2
|0〉9|1〉9′ .
Figure 3: Evolution in time of two modes through an interferometer satisfying (α|1〉1|0〉2 +
β|0〉1|1〉2)|0000〉1′,2′,4,8 Interferometer−→ (α2 |100000〉 + β−α2 |010000〉 − β2 |001000〉 + iα2 |000100〉 +
i(α+β)
2 |000010〉 + iβ2 |000001〉)5′,7′,9′,5,7,9. The numbers represent the appropriate mode number of each
pulse. The corresponding state is |ns0ns1ns2nd0nd1nd2〉.
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